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Abstract
This study presents a new firm- and project-level dataset containing data on over 
two million projects co-funded by the EU structural and cohesion funds in 25 EU 
member states during the programming period 2007–2013. Information on indi-
vidual beneficiary firms and institutions is linked with business data of Bureau van 
Dijk’s ORBIS database. Moreover, text mining techniques are applied to categorise 
the EU cohesion policy projects into fifteen thematic categories. Stylised facts reveal 
substantial regional heterogeneity in the distribution of funds to certain projects and 
beneficiaries (with respect to their size or industry). Furthermore, regional funds 
distribution differs across less developed and higher-income as well as urban and 
rural regions. In an econometric analysis, we control for project and firm character-
istics that we expect to determine the single project’s value, which is confirmed by 
the results. Nevertheless, there remains unexplained variation in individual project 
volumes, which differs systematically across countries.
Keywords Distribution of EU structural funds · Cohesion policy · Firm-level data · 
Cohesion · European Union
JEL Classification E61 · H77 · R11 · R58
1 Introduction
Under the cohesion policy framework, the European Union (EU) committed over 
EUR 348 billion from 2007 to 2013 (over EUR 371 billion in the multi-annual finan-
cial framework 2014–2020) to the re-distribution of funds among European regions 
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in order to foster regional development and cohesion. There is a broad literature that 
investigates different aspects of the effectiveness of those financial contributions, 
e.g., in terms of increasing income growth (see Dall’Erba and Fang 2017, for a sur-
vey). Due to a lack of data, research so far has mainly focused on the implementa-
tion of the policy and its effects at an aggregated, mostly regional, level. Neverthe-
less, the specific design of cohesion policy programmes remains a prominent theme 
in the academic and public debate, especially with respect to post-2020 EU cohesion 
policy. Apart from the allocation of funds to thematic priorities in a region, however, 
the intraregional distribution of funds to specific projects and beneficiaries has been 
a “black box” to researchers and European policy makers so far.
In principle, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF), in this study together referred to as 
the EU’s regional funds, co-finance projects that are part of operational programmes 
(OP) and pursue strategic priorities like strengthening the labour market, improv-
ing social infrastructure or building better traffic networks.1 The projects are car-
ried out by firms, institutions or other entities and are selected to be co-financed 
by the particular OP’s managing authority (a public or private body nominated by 
the member state).2 Therefore, next to the managing authorities’ responsibility for 
choosing suitable and promising projects, the actual beneficiaries are accountable 
for the single projects’ success. The appropriate fulfilment of these tasks (project 
selection and successful implementation) likely contributes to achieving the corre-
sponding OP’s target and, finally, the overall effectiveness of a region’s EU cohesion 
policy implementation.3
This study presents newly collected information on individual projects co-
financed by regional funds during the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 
2007–2013 and explores how the regional funds committed to European NUTS-2 
regions are distributed within the regions.4 The resulting database contains data on 
over two millions of co-funded projects in 25 EU member states. Those projects 
are carried out by 1,076,097 beneficiaries which we matched with the ORBIS busi-
ness database by Bureau van Dijk in order to gain information on their business 
characteristics.
Using that data, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a compre-
hensive analysis of the projects selected by national or regional managing authori-
ties during the MFF 2007–2013. The high level of granularity of the data allows 
to investigate whether the distribution of regional funds differs across European 
1 We do not consider projects co-funded by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) which are also EU cohesion policy 
instruments.
2 Refer to European Council (2006b) for detailed information on cohesion policy implementation.
3 The European Commission considers various indicators, e.g., the number of jobs created or the num-
ber of direct investment aid projects to small and medium-sized enterprises, for its evaluation of cohesion 
policy (see http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/en/polic y/evalu ation s/ec/2007-2013/#1).
4 Since the multi-annual financial framework 2007–2013, the managing authorities of the OPs are 
required to report the firms and institutions which receive financial support for carrying out projects that 
contribute to economic and social cohesion across European regions.
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regions with respect to project, geographical and firm-level characteristics of the 
funds’ beneficiaries.5 Thus, the availability of this micro data increases the trans-
parency of policy implementation. For example, it shows whether the EU’s funding 
priorities (e.g., the focus on small and medium-sized enterprises) are mirrored in 
cohesion policy implementation or if more guidance would be desirable. Moreover, 
the findings of this paper may be interesting for EU cohesion policy evaluators, as 
differences in the distribution of regional funds within regions may play a role for 
explaining differences in EU cohesion policy effectiveness across regions.
First, this study investigates the intraregional distribution of regional funds along 
different dimensions like the thematic priorities set by the OPs’ managing authori-
ties. This descriptive analysis distinguishes between different types of regions, 
i.e., less developed and richer, as well as urban and rural ones. One result is that 
a large share of regional funds in low-income regions is allocated to Transporta-
tion Infrastructure, Environment and Innovation and Research and Technological 
Development (RTD) projects. In the majority of the other regions, the largest project 
amounts are also assigned to the latter two themes, while, in addition, there is a 
stronger focus on labour market projects.
Second, since we are one of few contributions so far that are able to analyse 
regional fund data at the level of projects and beneficiaries in an encompassing way, 
we also focus on individual projects. In particular, we document substantial varia-
tion in project volumes across different funding instruments (i.e., the ERDF, ESF 
or CF), the objective of the OP (i.e., Convergence or Regional competitiveness and 
employment), the regional focus on thematic priorities, and beneficiaries’ character-
istics like firm size or industry. Moreover, related to the projects’ themes, we find 
that managing authorities in urban (as compared to rural) and less developed (as 
compared to higher-income) regions allocate the regional funds on average to rela-
tively large projects.
Third, after controlling for the project and beneficiary characteristics in a regres-
sion analysis, results show residual variation in project volumes that varies across 
countries and regions. In general, there is little literature on whether the size of 
(cohesion policy) grants to firms is related to the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
policy. Locatelli et al. (2017) indicate that the tendering of larger projects favours 
corruption in the public procurement process. Therefore, we argue that future 
research should investigate whether regional residual variation in average project 
values is linked to institutional settings or historically grown funding traditions in 
the respective country. Furthermore, the link between the latter as well as regional 
funds distribution patterns and the effectiveness of policy implementation should be 
explored.6
5 This paper provides details on the creation of the dataset that may be interesting to researchers working 
with similar data. One important feature in this context is the publication of the R package (fastTextR) 
which we use for classifying projects into fifteen themes defined by the European Commission and which 
we made publicly available.
6 E.g., for the field of industrial policy, Criscuolo et  al. (2012) indicate that granting funds to smaller 
firms yields better results than funding large firms, as, beside other reasons, the latter are more likely 
to displace own investments by the firm grants. Bachtrögler et  al. (2018) show for seven EU member 
states that, independently of their volume, projects carried out by manufacturing firms in regions with 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview 
on the EU cohesion policy design and places our analysis into the context of existing 
literature. Chapter 3 describes the content of the database in detail and compares it 
with aggregate official data. Chapter 4 provides stylised facts regarding the distri-
bution of total project volumes across (different types of) regions, project and firm 
characteristics. Chapter 5 shows the results of the econometric analysis with a focus 
on the individual project volume and, finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
2  The design of EU cohesion policy
In the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 2007–2013, the regional funds 
amounting to EUR 348,865 million were the second largest item of the EU budget.7 
The cohesion policy’s objective is to increase convergence across European regions 
by co-financing member states’ initiatives targeted at specific priorities. First, a 
NUTS-2 region’s principle eligibility for funding is determined according to three 
main objectives, namely, (1) Convergence (former Objective 1), (2) Regional Com-
petitiveness and Employment (former Objective 2), and (3) Territorial Cooperation 
(former Objective 3).8 Second, for eligible areas, the funds are allocated to opera-
tional programmes which co-finance projects that are carried out by private or pub-
lic firms or organizations. The new dataset presented in this study is based on lists of 
these beneficiary firms, institutions, non-governmental organizations or other types 
of entities (in the following we refer to all types of beneficiaries by the term firm) 
that have to be made public since the MFF 2007–2013 (Article 7 in European Com-
mission 2006).
2.1  The distribution of EU regional funds
The EU’s cohesion policy works under the principle of shared management (refer to 
Article 14 and 15 in European Commission 2006). That is why multiple European 
and national (as well as sub-national) institutions are involved in the allocation pro-
cess of regional funds.
Footnote 6 (continued)
lower GDP per capita tend to be (partly statistically significantly) more effective in increasing beneficiary 
firms’ employment and value added growth than similar projects run by firms in richer regions within the 
same country.
7 Most expenditure, i.e., EUR 412,611 million, is allocated to the “natural resources” programme 
which includes agricultural subsidies. See http://ec.europ a.eu/budge t/figur es/fin_fwk07 13/fwk07 13_
en.cfm#cf07_13.
8 NUTS regions at different levels are defined according to the Nomenclature des unités territoriales 
statistiques 2010 (NUTS 2010) (European Commission 2011). In the MFF 2007–2013, regions with a 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita below 75% of the EU-25 average in 2000–2002 are eligible 
for funds under the Convergence objective. The remaining regions are eligible for transfers under the 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective and Territorial cooperation initiatives (Article 3 
in European Council 2006b). Member states can apply for support from the Cohesion Fund if their gross 
national income (GNI) per capita lies below 90% of the EU average.
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For each MFF, the European Council prepares a document with strategic guide-
lines on reducing economic, social and territorial disparities. These guidelines for 
2007–2013 encompass three priorities (European Council 2006a): (1) improving 
transport infrastructure, environmental and energy issues, (2) creating more and bet-
ter jobs, and (3) a focus on knowledge transfer and innovation. Regarding the latter, 
special emphasis is put on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
which “often represent the highest source of employment at the regional level” 
(European Council 2006a, p. 19). The strategic guidelines on cohesion serve as a 
basis for the so-called national strategic reference framework that needs to be pro-
vided by each member state. The national strategic reference framework provides an 
overview of fields for intervention of cohesion policy in the particular country and 
undergoes a review process by the European Commission. Besides a proposal for 
the annual allocation of regional funds across the period, the member states need to 
generate a list of operational programmes (per objective and fund) for the objectives 
Convergence and Regional Competitiveness and Employment. Each operational pro-
gramme is prepared and implemented by a managing authority, a private or public 
body appointed by the member state (Article 59 of European Council 2006b). In the 
most cases (in the case of a national OP always) it has a specified thematic target, 
e.g., improving regional human capital or social infrastructure. In most cases, they 
refer to particular NUTS-2 or NUTS-1 regions, however, there are also national, 
NUTS-0, programmes (see Appendix A.1 and Title III in European Council 2006b). 
The OPs must incorporate reasons for focusing on specific priority axes proposed by 
the Commission (see Annex IV of European Council 2006b).9 From these priority 
axes, the European Commission derives fifteen so-called (priority) themes.
In the next step, the OPs’ managing authorities select appropriate projects that 
are carried out by firms, i.e., the beneficiaries.10 According to Article 2 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, a beneficiary is defined as “an operator, body or 
firm, whether public or private, responsible for initiating and implementing opera-
tions”. An operation is referred to as “a project or groups of projects selected by the 
managing authority of the operational programme [...] allowing achievement of the 
goals of the priority axis to which it relates” (European Council 2006b). The amount 
of EU co-funding for each project depends on the eligible expenditure and the desig-
nated co-financing rate.11
The structure of the new database builds on these regulations. The dataset 
includes the OP to which each observation (project) is assigned, the corresponding 
fund, objective as well as the theme. Thus, we are able to check the validity of our 
9 See also “ERDF/ESF/CF Priority theme overview 2007–2013” at http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/
en/polic y/evalu ation s/data-for-resea rch/.
10 Note that data on applications for cohesion policy projects are not available. Therefore, we cannot 
control for the self-selection of firms.
11 Annex III of European Council (2006b) reports the ceilings for co-financing rates, i.e., the maximum 
percentage of eligible expenditure that is financed by a regional fund. E.g., the maximum co-financing 
rate for Spain amounts to 80% for the Convergence and to 50% for the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment objective. The detailed regulation on the eligibility of expenditure can be found in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006.
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data by comparing it in different dimensions with official numbers on a more aggre-
gate level by DG REGIO (see Sect. 3.3).
While the next section covers the literature that evaluates the effects of cohesion 
policy on regions or firms, there is also a literature that discusses the allocation pro-
cess and the factors that potentially influence this bargaining. Bachtler and Mendez 
(2007) discuss the history of the allocation process up to the beginning of the MFF 
2007–2013. They narratively highlight the negotiation process between member 
states and the EU Commission as well as the ongoing spatial concentration of the 
majority of funds. A more quantitative line of research (e.g., Bouvet and Dall’Erba 
2010; Dellmuth 2011; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; Tosun 2014) finds that, indeed, 
factors such as the political situation, the type of governance, previous success of 
implementation or even the degree of eurosceptisism drive part of the allocation 
process.
2.2  Literature review
Most studies that analyse cohesion policy in a pan-European setting focus on the 
regional (in many cases NUTS-2) level (Hagen and Mohl 2009; Pienkowski and 
Berkowitz 2016). Most recently, Dall’Erba and Fang (2017) provide a meta-analysis 
of econometric studies on the evaluation of cohesion policy effects.
Generally speaking, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the outcome 
of cohesion policy. The effectiveness is measured, e.g., as a positive effect on gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita growth (e.g., Pellegrini et al. 2013), investments 
per capita (Becker et al. 2013) or regional research and development activity (Fer-
rara et  al. 2016). Most studies find a conditional positive effect of regional funds 
assignment (e.g., Becker et  al. 2013; Cappelen et  al. 2003; Ferrara et  al. 2016), 
while others provide results that even suggest a negative impact (Breidenbach et al. 
2016). In recent years, the potential reasons for heterogeneous (conditional) cohe-
sion policy effects have gained major attention.
First, Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) move the focus to expenditure catego-
ries of the main funding instruments. They find that investments in infrastructure or 
agriculture do not have sustainable effects on regional growth (see also Puga 2002; 
Dall’Erba and Le Gallo 2008), though, projects that foster human capital lead to sus-
tainable positive effects on economic cohesion. This and other studies use data on 
the distribution of expenditure across NUTS-2 regions and themes (e.g., Dall’Erba 
and Le Gallo 2007; Percoco 2013; Ferrara et al. 2016).
Second, regional heterogeneity as a determinant of policy effectiveness has 
become a topic of interest and is often modelled by a region’s capacity to take 
advantage of regional funds. Becker et  al. (2013) indicate that human capital and 
institutional quality matter for the effectiveness of Objective 1 funds in terms of 
their effect on GDP per capita growth and investment. Institutions are confirmed as 
influencing factor for the success of cohesion policy by other authors as well (e.g., 
Cappelen et al. 2003; Bachtler et al. 2014; Rodríguez-Pose 2013). Recently, Gagli-
ardi and Percoco (2017) show that European cohesion policy is most effective in 
rural regions that are located close to cities.
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Third, Becker et al. (2012) take the amount of regional funds expenditure spent 
in a region into account (instead of treatment dummies) and conclude that there is 
a maximum efficient level of funds and paying more does not increase the effec-
tiveness any more (see also Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 2012; Rodríguez-Pose 
and Garcilazo 2015).
Fourth, Becker et  al. (2018) and Bachtrögler (2016) analyse the effects of 
structural funds (on income growth) in lagging regions over time and in the con-
text of the economic and financial crisis starting in 2007. The latter finds that the 
effectiveness of cohesion policy in terms of increasing GDP per capita growth 
appears to decrease in the crisis compared to former periods when controlling for 
regional structural characteristics. Barone et al. (2016) also take the time dimen-
sion into account and show that cohesion policy effects are not persistent over 
time.
Finally, spatial heterogeneity and spillovers are considered to play a role for cohe-
sion policy effectiveness (Le Gallo et  al. 2011; Breidenbach et  al. 2016; Maynou 
et al. 2016). This strand of the literature widely confirms some small positive effects 
on regional growth or convergence for a number of regions but no general overall 
effect.
The majority of studies named above are based on data at the regional or local 
level to study growth or convergence effects. One major drawback of this type of 
analysis is the potential endogeneity of structural funds. As they are especially 
granted to lower-income regions, cohesion policy is most likely not exogenous with 
respect to regional growth. Attempts to overcome this statistical problem include the 
use of time lags (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004), different instruments (Dall’Erba 
and Le Gallo 2007, 2008), generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators 
(Breidenbach et al. 2016) or a computable general equilibrium approach (Horridge 
and Rokicki 2018). Another way to possibly identify causal effects is the use of 
microeconometric methods with regional or micro data.
Turning to the beneficiaries as unit of observation, De  Zwaan and Merlevede 
(2013) evaluate the effects of Objective 1 and Objective 2 payments in the program-
ming period 2000–2006 in 25 EU member states on productivity and employment 
growth of firms in treated and non-treated regions. However, they do not use actual 
recipients of regional funds but compare all manufacturing firms (available in the 
ORBIS database) located in treated regions with the manufacturing firms in non-
treated regions. Additional firm-level analyses are available for sub-national geo-
graphical units (Bernini and Pellegrini 2011) and certain types of regional funds 
(Hartsenko and Sauga 2012).
As we overcome this lack of data with the new database, this paper contributes 
to the literature by giving the first detailed insights on actual beneficiaries (and 
projects) of cohesion policy in 25 EU member states between 2007 and 2013. A 
combined analysis of the projects’ theme, firm-level characteristics of correspond-
ing beneficiaries and the size of the projects’ expenditure may help to explain het-
erogeneous effects of regional funds allocation found in the literature, and thereby, 
lead to important policy implications. Moreover, it allows to identify regional funds 
allocation patterns across regions, e.g., less developed and others as well as urban 
and rural regions, and countries (see Sects. 4 and 5).
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3  A novel dataset
3.1  Content of the dataset
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
(DG REGIO) provides a collection of links to national or regional websites that 
make lists of beneficiaries available.12 Unfortunately, the degree of detail of these 
lists’ content as well as their structure vary significantly across countries, regions 
and even operational programmes.13 Moreover, most documents are provided in 
national languages, different data formats and using non-standardised definitions. 
Besides collecting and processing all information, we extend the data on beneficiar-
ies by matching it with the ORBIS business database by Bureau van Dijk.
The resulting set of variables can be grouped into three blocks, namely, (1) pro-
ject information, (2) funding (co-financing) information, and (3) business charac-
teristics of the beneficiary retrieved from ORBIS. First, the project information 
includes the country and NUTS region in which the project is carried out accord-
ing to the OP and list of beneficiaries, respectively.14 Moreover, it covers the co-
financing fund, the objective and corresponding OP to which the project is assigned. 
As already noted, the dataset includes projects co-funded by the ERDF, the ESF 
and the CF, under the objectives of Convergence and Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment. Next, a project name or description, the start and end date as well as 
the theme of the project are specified. The theme is not reported by all managing 
authorities, which is why we classify the remaining projects according to available 
project information using supervised text classification (see Sect. 3.2 for a detailed 
description). The fifteen themes are: (1) Capacity Building, (2) Culture, Heritage 
and Tourism, (3) Energy, (4) Environment, (5) Human Capital, (6) Innovation & 
Research and Technological Development (RTD), (7) IT Services and Infrastruc-
ture, (8) Labour Market, (9) Other SME and Business Support, (10) Other Trans-
port, (11) Rail, (12) Road, (13) Social Inclusion, (14) Social Infrastructure, and (15) 
Urban and Territorial Dimension.
The second group of variables describes the funding structure. It contains the 
committed co-financing amounts by the EU (C_EU) and the national public funding 
(C_NAT; including co-funding of the recipient regions) as defined in the beginning 
of the MFF 2007–2013.15 If the amount borne by the firm itself (ineligible cost, 
Inelig16) is reported, it is added to the sum of co-funding commitments in order to 
calculate a total value for project i:
12 See http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/en/atlas /benefi ciar ies/.
13 In Appendix A.1, we provide an overview of all OPs together with information on each one covered in 
our database.
14 If that information is not evident in the managing authority’s report, we consider the NUTS-2 region 
in which the beneficiary is located according to ORBIS, if available.
15 Appendix A.1 reports the degree of detail in which the financial information on projects is provided in 
the lists of beneficiaries.
16 Article 56 in European Council (2006b) states the definition of project expenditure that is eligible for 
co-funding.
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In addition to the commitments, project values that were actually paid out by 
European (Paid_EU) or national (Paid_NAT) public funds are available for a sub-
set of observations. If only the actually paid-out value is declared, the total project 
value represents the sum of EU (ERDF, ESF or CF) and national payments (includ-
ing those from regional governments):
Furthermore, the declaration date refers to the time of reporting of the respective 
list of beneficiaries. In case it is not noted, we use the date of download.17
The third information block relates to the beneficiary. This data is produced by 
a matching exercise (using the name of the firm and its home country) with the 
ORBIS business database. We are aware of several shortcomings of this database 
(see, e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2015), however, it represents the most comprehen-
sive and accessible international business database.18 The resulting dataset contains 
the firm’s name in ORBIS and its location, its founding year and information on 
the industry in which it operates (NACE Rev. 2 industry and four-digits code), the 
firms’ number of employees and sales volume. Moreover, there is a size classifica-
tion by ORBIS that is based on at least one of the following variables: the firms’ 
number of employees, total assets, operating revenue and whether it is listed at the 
stock exchange.19 Furthermore, the database contains information on whether a firm 
belongs to a corporate group and, if so, on the number of entities in this group.
Table 1 shows all variables and their coverage in the database, i.e., the share of all 
observations for which it is available. The OP, its location, the funding instrument, 
the objective as well as the name of the project and the beneficiary is available for 
each project. Moreover, the dataset provides at least a total project value for each 
observation. 39% of the observations could be matched with ORBIS.
For analysing whether the distribution of regional funds in (less) developed as 
well as in urban and rural regions, respectively, shows different patterns, we need 
to gather further regional characteristics. Less developed regions are defined as 
NUTS-2 regions which are eligible for funds under the Convergence objective (for-
mer Objective 1), i.e., whose income per capita is lower than 75% of the EU-25 
average (in 2000–2002) (European Council 2006b). According to the share of the 
(1)Total valuei = C_EUi + C_NATi + Ineligi
(2)Total valuei = Paid_EUi + Paid_NATi
17 Payments corresponding to the MFF 2007–2013 have been transferred until the end of 2015, that is, 
not all have been reported at the time of data collection.
18 More information on ORBIS is available on the following website: http://www.bvdin fo.com/en-gb/
our-produ cts/compa ny-infor matio n/inter natio nal-produ cts/orbis .
19 Very large company: listed, operating revenue greater or equal to EUR 100 million or total assets 
greater or equal to EUR 200 million or 1000 or more employees. Large company: Operating revenue 
greater or equal to EUR 10 million or total assets greater or equal to EUR 20 million or 150 or more 
employees. Medium-sized company: operating revenue greater or equal to EUR 1 million or total assets 
greater or equal to EUR 2 million or 15 or more employees. Small company: companies that do not fall 
in any of the other categories. As companies are classified as small ones if no data points are available, 
we do not consider this variable in regressions in Sect.  5. However, comparing the distribution of the 
ORBIS size category with the number of employees (more than 15, 150 or 1000) shows a similar picture.
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population living in urban areas, DG REGIO classifies European NUTS-3 regions 
into predominantly urban, predominantly rural and intermediate ones (see Dijkstra 
and Poelman 2011)]. In this study, we distinguish between predominantly urban and 
other regions. As one can see in Table 1, due to the low coverage of the more dis-
aggregated NUTS-3 locational information in ORBIS, this variable is known for a 
third of all observations.
3.2  Missing themes
As described in Sect. 2, the projects can be categorised into fifteen themes as defined 
by DG REGIO. Since not all managing authorities publish these themes in their lists 
of beneficiaries but most of them provide a project description and a project name, 
we employ supervised text classification to predict the missing project themes.
In order to train the classification algorithm (classifier) we use theme labels 
reported by some managing authorities, augmented with manually assigned theme 
labels. Since some of the project descriptions are given in a language other than 
English, we first use Google Cloud Translation API to translate the pro-
ject descriptions and project names into English. Although we cannot quantify how 
many errors have been introduced during the translation process, we report the over-
all accuracy of the classification, where some part of error is attributed to translation 
errors. The records which cannot be translated are left unchanged. Then we remove 
those observations where the project name and description together have fewer than 
30 characters. Thus, we overall use 1,698,191 projects (82.62% of all observations) 
and 588,713 labeled projects (28.64% of all observations) to train and evaluate the 
classifier.
Choosing an appropriate classifier is a non-trivial task. We find the recently pub-
lished fastText20 library (Joulin et  al. 2016) to perform well on our dataset in 
terms of the performance metrics precision, recall and accuracy.21 In text classifica-
tion, it is often desirable not to use the words of a text directly for estimation but to 
first map the text into a vector space with a much lower dimension. The fastText 
library which uses a single hidden layer neural network can be applied for text clas-
sification and to learn the vector representations of words.
The basic idea of the model is to proceed in two steps: first, the data is mapped 
into a low dimensional vector space (i.e., each sentence is mapped into a numeric 
vector) in such a way that similar texts have similar vector representations. Second, 
multinomial logistic regression is used to predict the labels.
For the evaluation of the classification we use the tenfold cross validation method 
(Stone 1974). In k-fold cross validation the data is randomly split into k parts, where 
k − 1 parts are used for training the model and the remaining part is used for model 
evaluation. To test the model on all available data, this process is typically repeated 
k times. In Fig.  1 we report the confusion matrix (a special type of contingency 
20 https ://githu b.com/faceb ookre searc h/fastT ext.
21 Due to the size of our data some of the alternative methods are overly time-consuming or run out of 
memory and are therefore excluded from further considerations.
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Table 1  List of variables and their coverage in the dataset
Total number of observations: 2,055,375. The coverage denotes the share of observations for which each 
variable is available. The location refers to the corresponding OP or, if the OP cannot be assigned to a 
region, we use the matched location information from ORBIS
Variable Coverage (%)
Project information
Country (NUTS-0) 100
Location (NUTS-2, NUTS-1) 97
Type of fund (ERDF, ESF, CF) 99
Objective (unique) 75
Operational programme 99
Name or description of project 97
Detailed project description 39
Project start date 19
Project end date 14
Theme 83
Name of the beneficiary 100
Funding information
Currency 100
Amount of EU support—committed 15
Amount of national support (co-financing)—committed 5
Non-eligible cost paid by beneficiary 2
Total project value 100
Amount of EU support—paid out 15
Amount of national support (co-financing)—paid out 3
Declaration date 100
Business information (ORBIS)
Name of the firm 39
Detailed address information 36
Founding year 32
NACE Rev. 2 industry (main category) 33
NACE Rev. 2 code (4 digits) 33
ORBIS size category (four categories) 38
Number of employees (last available year) 18
Volume of sales (last available year) 22
Number of companies in corporate group 17
Regional characteristics
Less developed region or not (classification by NUTS-2 region) 82
Location (NUTS-3) 33
Predominantly urban region or not (classification by NUTS-3 region) 33
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table) for one of the ten cross folds, specifically, we choose to report the results for 
the cross fold with the lowest accuracy. The rows indicate the true known themes 
and the columns the predicted themes. Let X be the confusion matrix, then preci-
sion, recall and accuracy are defined as follows:
Therefore, precision, recall and accuracy are equal to one if all the predicted themes 
are correct (the confusion matrix has only entries in the main diagonal) and zero 
if all the predicted themes are wrong (the confusion matrix has no entries in the 
(3)precisionj =
Xjj
∑
i Xij
, recalli =
Xii∑
j Xij
, accuracy =
∑
i Xii∑
ij Xij
.
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Fig. 1  Confusion matrix of the theme prediction. Notes: The numbers in the figure show the results of 
the classification of projects. The width of the green rectangles of the diagonal represents the recall and 
the height of the rectangles of the diagonal pictures the precision. Since all rectangles are almost filling 
their cell, the confusion matrix shows that the classification works well
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main diagonal). The rectangles in Fig. 1 visualise the row and column percentages 
of the confusion matrix. The width of the rectangles represents the row percentages 
and the height of the rectangles the column percentages. Therefore, the width of the 
rectangles of the diagonal corresponds to the recall, the height of the rectangles of 
the diagonal to the precision and the volumes of the rectangles of the diagonal to the 
squared G-measurei (G-measurei =
√
precisioni × recalli).
In the confusion matrix, we see that, given the true theme Other Transport, in 
105 cases the model is able to predict the true label and in seven cases the model 
predicts the theme Road. Overall, we obtain an average classification accuracy of 
0.94. However, for completeness we note that there are duplicates in the trainings 
and test set. Accounting for this, the average accuracy without duplicates is 0.90. 
In order to make the classification results easily reproducible, we assemble the R 
(R Core Team 2016) package fastTextR that contains an interface to the fast-
Text library and is available at CRAN.22
3.3  Comparison of the dataset with official data
We assess the validity of the assembled data by checking for outliers and plausi-
bility and comparing its dimension with official data on regional funds assignment 
(equivalent to C_EUi in Eq. 1) published by DG REGIO. Table 2 shows the sum of 
total project values in the database ( Total valuei in Eq. 1) per country and objective, 
excluding projects which cannot be assigned to a specific objective. The total values 
in the database in general do not only consist of committed values by the EU. Multi-
plying the total project values with the maximum co-financing rate per country and 
objective (see Sect. 2.1) results in the highest amount the EU should provide. If the 
official committed value, given in the last column of Table 2, is lower or equal to the 
maximum EU’s co-funding, we expect the sum of total project values in our data-
base to be plausible. The latter is true for the large majority of member states. For 
Bulgaria, lists of beneficiaries are available for only less than a third of their opera-
tional programmes. The Estonian source is an online database which might not yet 
contain all projects. For Denmark, the gap may arise due to the total project value 
summing up paid-out and not committed amounts in the database.
Next, we compare the distribution of regional funds among co-financing instru-
ments and themes as reported in the database and by DG REGIO. First, 55% of the 
sum of total project values correspond to projects co-funded by the ERDF (unequiv-
ocal classification) while according to data by DG REGIO around the same amount 
(58%) of structural funds and the Cohesion Fund is transferred via the ERDF. For 
ESF, the share of the total project values amounts to 22% which is exactly the same 
one as in official data. As several operational programmes are co-funded by the 
ERDF and the CF and there is no more detailed information reported in the lists 
of beneficiaries, we are able to attribute only about 4% of total project values in the 
database to the Cohesion Fund. For about 20%, we cannot clearly say which one of 
22 https ://CRAN.R-proje ct.org/packa ge=fastT extR.
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the funds is the supporting one. Following DG REGIO data, about 20% of structural 
and Cohesion funds commitments are settled via the Cohesion Fund, i.e., it is likely 
that the major part of the not uniquely assigned total values in the lists of beneficiar-
ies can be attributed to the Cohesion Fund.
Regarding the distribution of funds and total project values across the fifteen 
themes (project categories), our database proves to be consistent with official data 
(Fig.  2). The highest project expenditure is dedicated to Innovation & RTD and 
Environment according to the dataset and as also reported by DG REGIO.
4  Descriptive statistics
4.1  Stylised facts: the intraregional distribution of regional funds
In cohesion policy regulations, the EU institutions specify priority themes to be tar-
geted by operational programmes in a programming period but do not preset any 
detailed requirements regarding the size or other characteristics of the projects or 
beneficiaries to be selected.23 Therefore, we expect that there is no uniform strat-
egy for distributing regional funds at the project level across European regions. 
The selection of projects by managing authorities is likely to depend on the accord-
ance with an OP’s underlying priority themes and its main objective, as well as the 
assessment of the capability of potential beneficiaries to carry out the project (with 
a certain volume).
One of the features of the data that has not been analysed in previous literature 
is the variation in average project values shown in the top right-hand side of Fig. 3. 
This variable ranges between EUR 15,520 per project in Marche, Italy, and EUR 
57,814,068 in Ireland. While it is comparably small in Central European countries, 
the average project value is relatively high in some North European regions (in the 
UK, Denmark or Belgium) as well as the member states that joined the EU in 2004 
and later. While there are additional reasons for the regional variation in the average 
total values such as project and beneficiary characteristics, this suggests that regions 
with fewer projects, on average, have higher total values per project.
The left upper part of Fig. 3 presents the number of projects per region, which 
varies between 32 in South-East England, UK, and over 85,000 in Puglia, Italy. 
There are regions with many projects like Puglia, Italy, or North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Germany, which are typically characterised by a high number of projects related to 
the themes Labour Market or Human Capital. Both themes are associated with rela-
tively low project amounts.24 Contrarily, the regions in which the largest share of 
funds is allocated to Transportation Infrastructure projects (in Poland and Croatia) 
23 It is required to take care of gender aspects and non-discrimination in the course of implementing 
cohesion policy.
24 Refer to the Online Appendix for a descriptive analysis of the distribution of total project values 
among themes and other project and firm characteristics. Moreover, this finding is mirrored in estimation 
results in Sect. 5.
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Table 2  Comparison with official DG REGIO data on regional funds (in million Euros)
Country Obj. Sum of total project 
values in database
Maximum EU co-
financing rate (%)
Maximum EU 
co-financing
Sum of allocated 
EU regional 
funds
Total value
i
C_EU
i
AT 1 232 75 174 102
2 2063 50 1032 473
BE 1 1849 75 1387 451
2 4226 50 2113 546
BG 1 2673 85 2272 6313
2 0 85 0 0
CZ 1 22,717 85 19,309 17,555
2 408 85 347 206
DE 1 18,445 75 13,834 10,599
2 16,798 50 8399 4530
DK 1 0 75 0 0
2 491 50 246 250
EE 1 1848 85 1571 2836
2 0 85 0 0
ES 1 28,415 80 22,732 12,415
2 10,354 50 5177 3792
FI 1 0 75 0 0
2 6754 50 3377 998
FR 1 7300 75 5475 1876
2 35,042 50 17,521 5289
HR 1 1592 85 1353 377
2 0 85 0 0
IE 1 0 75 0 0
2 6193 50 3097 414
IT 1 29,443 75 22,082 17,955
2 16,533 50 8267 3171
LT 1 9186 85 7808 5556
2 0 85 0 0
LU 1 0 75 0 0
2 102 50 51 24
LV 1 7171 85 6095 3894
2 0 85 0 0
MT 1 948 85 806 708
2 0 85 0 0
NL 1 0 75 0 0
2 6263 50 3132 866
PL 1 127,045 85 107,988 57,138
2 0 85 0 0
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Source: DG REGIO, Open Data Portal for European Structural and Investment Funds
Obj. (Objective): 1 stands for Convergence, 2 for Regional Competitiveness and Employment. From our 
database, we do not consider funds where an unique assignment of an objective is not possible. From DG 
REGIO data, we do not consider committments assigned to multiple objectives (multi objective)
Table 2  (continued)
Country Obj. Sum of total project 
values in database
Maximum EU co-
financing rate (%)
Maximum EU 
co-financing
Sum of allocated 
EU regional 
funds
Total value
i
C_EU
i
PT 1 23,880 85 20,298 10,538
2 1912 85 1625 642
RO 1 36,888 85 31,355 16,010
2 0 85 0 0
SE 1 0 75 0 0
2 2571 50 1286 925
SI 1 5180 85 4403 2641
2 0 85 0 0
SK 1 13,640 85 11,594 8144
2 132 85 112 79
UK 1 5004 75 3753 1762
2 9588 50 4794 3527
Fig. 2  Comparison of distribution of committed regional funds with DG REGIO data: shares (%) of sum 
of total project values. Notes: Source DG REGIO: “ERDF/ESF/CF Priority theme overview 2007–2013” 
downloadable at http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/en/polic y/evalu ation s/data-for-resea rch/
are characterised by relatively large project values. Also other regions, like South-
East England, UK, or Vienna, Austria, have few but on average large projects. 
One underlying reason may be that some regions tend to report relatively many 
1 3
Empirica 
Fig. 3  Regional distribution. Notes: Number of projects (observations) per region: Min.: 32, 1st Qu.: 
569, Median: 3220, Mean: 6526, 3rd Qu.: 8326, Max: 85,420. Average value per project (in million 
Euros): Min.: 0.02, 1st Qu.: 0.22, Median: 0.44, Mean: 1.18, 3rd Qu.: 1.10, Max: 14.10. Sum of regional 
project values as share of regional GDP (sum of 2007–2013): Min.: 0.01, 1st Qu.: 0.17, Median: 0.35, 
Mean: 0.91, 3rd Qu.: 1.10, Max: 8.45. Theme group with maximum sum of total project values by 
region: transportation refers to Road, Rail, Other transport; Social inclusion is part of the human capital 
group; business services are Innovation & RTD, Other SME and business support, Capacity building, 
IT services and infrastructure. Total project values are defined in Sect. 3. While the lists of beneficiar-
ies published by the managing authorities do not permit to assign projects to regions Helsinki, Finland, 
as well as Dutch regions, the figure shows observations for Dutch regions that are matched with ORBIS 
which contains information on the location of firms
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intermediate beneficiaries like public institutions on a municipal level. Those bod-
ies apply for the funds, however, they redistribute them further or use them to carry 
out projects for smaller entities. In those cases, the ultimate beneficiaries are not 
known publicly. Finally, a part of the remaining variation in the number of projects 
may be largely explained by poor data availability. In Croatia, not all projects could 
be assigned to a NUTS-2 region given the report by the managing authority. For 
Bulgaria, lists of beneficiaries are only available for two out of nine operational 
programmes.
The dataset consists of over two million projects granted to approximately one 
million individual beneficiaries. That means, on average, every beneficiary receives 
co-financing for two projects. Only 17% of beneficiaries carry out more than one 
project, only 3% have more than five and only 1% more than ten. The beneficiary 
with the most co-financed projects (more than 18,000) is the Spanish ICEX Espana 
Exportación e Inversiones, a governmental institution that promotes (foreign) invest-
ments in Spain. The second most (more than 11,000) are carried out in the city of 
Florence, Italy, the third most (more than 10,000) by the governmental training and 
orientation section of the region of Tuscany, Italy.
Besides project and beneficiary characteristics, one stylised fact arising from the 
data confirms the focus of EU cohesion policy of providing most financial support to 
less developed regions: one main objective of the EU’s cohesion policy is to support 
the catching-up of those regions, i.e., NUTS-2 regions with a GDP per capita below 
75% of the EU-average, in economic and social terms. As one can see in Fig. 3 (left 
lower map), in Southern Italy, Portugal and Spain as well as Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria, the Baltics or Slovenia, the total values of co-financed projects relative 
to the respective regional income tend to be larger than in other regions. E.g., for 
the Lithuania and Poland, project values account for up to eight percent of regional 
GDP.25
Contrarily, in the so-called “Blue Banana”26 the sum of total project values lies 
below 0.1% of regional GDP. In those regions, projects with the highest expenditure 
tend to be carried out by small and medium-sized firms in the education sector, in 
public administration as well as in professional, scientific and technical activities. 
Those projects are mostly aimed at Regional Competitiveness and Employment and 
the themes Innovation & RTD as well as Human Capital. The sum of project values 
in Scandinavian, French, Northern Italian, North-Eastern Spanish regions as well 
as Scotland and Northern Ireland, UK, ranges between 0.1% and 0.5% of regional 
GDP. Project values per capita follow a similar overall distribution. The amount in 
25 All of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia are eligible for Conver-
gence (former Objective 1) funding in 2007–2013 (European Council 2006b). The region with the high-
est project values as percentage of its regional GDP is Podkarpackie in Southeast Poland with 8.45% 
or EUR 8.2 billion. According to DG REGIO, over EUR 67 billion have been committed to Poland in 
2007–2013. Bulgaria and Romania joined the cohesion policy programme 2007–2013 with a lag and 
therefore received little funds relative to their GDP.
26 Populous and usually rich regions that range from the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, parts of Ger-
many, Austria to Northern Italy.
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most regions falls below EUR 500. The region with the highest value per capita is 
Bratislava, Slovakia, with EUR 12,575 per inhabitant over the course of seven years.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the average project values in less devel-
oped versus developed regions, and confirms this finding. Projects carried out by 
beneficiaries in less developed regions are larger on average. A t-test on the sig-
nificance of the mean differences shows that they are statistically significant at the 
1%-level. Most of the projects there correspond to the Road, Environment but also 
Innovation & RTD themes and are carried out by very large firms that operate in 
public administration and the manufacturing industry. By contrast, large shares 
of regional funds in higher-income regions go to Innovation & RTD, Environ-
ment and Labour market projects, while less money is dedicated to transportation 
infrastructure.
Gagliardi and Percoco (2017) indicate that the effectiveness of EU cohesion 
policy varies across urban and rural (NUTS-3) regions, thus, we are also interested 
in potential differences in the usage of regional funds in such areas. The summary 
statistics of project values shown in Table 3 reveal statistically significantly higher 
average single project values in (predominantly) urban NUTS-3 regions. The follow-
ing section provides more details on the differences in regional funds distribution 
within urban versus within rural regions.
4.2  The intraregional distribution of funds with respect to project and firm 
characteristics
Type of fund, objectives and themes
The allocation of regional funds to OPs co-financed by different types of funds 
and under different main objectives is closely related to previous findings regard-
ing the development status of regions and the choice of thematic priorities.27 The 
total values of projects subsidised by the ERDF sum to roughly EUR 270 billion 
compared to EUR 107 billion from the ESF and EUR 18 billion from the CF. In 
addition, projects accounting for EUR 100 billion are most likely funded by the CF. 
Typically, the Cohesion Fund (CF), for which only regions in countries with a gross 
national income below 90% of the EU average are eligible, is targeted at co-financ-
ing (large) infrastructure projects and the accessibility of lagging-behind regions. A 
major part of the European Social Fund (ESF) is allocated to projects with relatively 
smaller project values fostering, e.g., human capital, while the ERDF co-finances a 
broad spectrum of project types. These funding priorities are mirrored in the vol-
ume of corresponding projects: the median CF project value amounts to about EUR 
100,000 compared to EUR 37,000 for the ERDF and EUR 3200 for the ESF.
Co-financing by different funds additionally varies across types of regions 
(Table  4). By construction, the CF is more important in less developed regions, 
while the ESF accounts for only around 10% of project volumes in those poorest 
regions. It is interesting that the CF plays a larger role for co-funded project volumes 
27 This allocation is negotiated when setting up the OPs, before the actual process of project selection.
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in (predominantly) urban regions as compared to rural ones. According to the data, 
this may be related to the fact that there are more relatively large Road projects 
funded in areas with higher population density.
The overall objective of the OP each project is part of, is closely related to the 
development status of the regions, as, along with several exemptions, only less 
developed regions are eligible for Convergence funds. While around half of the 
(number of) projects in our sample is aimed at Convergence, their value is three 
times as large as that of Regional Competitiveness and Employment projects. As 
expected, operational programmes in less developed regions have a focus on Con-
vergence, while OPs in richer regions receive more to boost Regional Competitive-
ness and Employment.
For the appropriate targeting of regional funds, the European Commission 
defines fifteen priority themes (see Sect. 3.2) to classify projects. In total, the largest 
sums are committed to projects in categories Innovation & RTD (EUR 70 billion), 
Environment (EUR 65 billion) and Other SME and Business Support (EUR 46 bil-
lion), followed by Labour Market, Road and Human Capital projects. The number 
of observations per theme ranges from 1058 Rail projects to over 600,000 projects 
related to the Labour Market. There is also considerable variation of individual pro-
ject values across themes. Projects related to Transportation (EUR 1–3 million), 
Urban and Territorial Dimension as well as Culture Heritage and Tourism (EUR 
200,000 each) are the largest. Human Capital (EUR 6000), Labour Market (EUR 
2200) and Energy (EUR 1250) projects are the smallest.
Additionally, the lower right part of Fig. 3 shows the theme at which the maxi-
mum sum of project values in a region is targeted. For better readability the map 
shows five groups of themes instead of all fifteen.28 In total, the largest sums in 
Poland and Croatia are related to Transportation projects. Energy and Environ-
ment projects are most important in Latvia, parts of the Czech Republic, two French 
regions, three Spanish regions and a Polish region. Contributions to Culture, Tour-
ism and Social Infrastructure are most pronounced in some Czech regions and East 
Slovakia. Scotland, South Sweden, almost all of Italy and parts of Germany and 
France have their largest project sums related to Human Capital, the Labour Market 
Table 3  Summary statistics in EUR 1000
Minimum of zero is due to rounding. Some projects have project values below EUR 1000
Min Median Mean Max
Average project value, developed regions 15 352 514 4226
Average project value, less developed regions 89 848 1392 9032
Average project value, urban regions 0 242 1167 29,962
Average project value, rural regions 2 150 641 19,530
28 The aggregation of the themes is based on a hierarchical clustering, where we use the cosine dissimi-
larity as distance measure and Ward’s method (Ward Jr 1963) for the clustering. More information about 
the clustering of text data can be found in Feinerer et al. (2008).
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and Social Inclusion. The largest project sums in the rest of Europe are associated 
with the fifth category that includes SME and Business Services, IT services and 
infrastructure, Capacity Building, Innovation & RTD as well as Urban and Territo-
rial Dimension.
Comparing all less developed to all higher-income regions, differences in the 
average distribution of total project values across priority themes become apparent 
Table 4  Summary statistics by type of fund, theme and beneficiary size
Summary statistics of total project values by type of funds (funding instrument), theme and beneficiar-
ies’ size respectively in thousand Euros. Sums of total values for first subset: 495 billion EUR—238 bill. 
EUR (less dev.), 121 bill. EUR (dev.)—87 bill. EUR (rural), 121 bill. EUR (urban), second subset: 442 
bill. EUR—223 bill. EUR (less dev.), 101 bill. (dev.)—81 bill. EUR (rural), 109 bill. (urban), third sub-
set: 305 bill EUR—179 bill. EUR (less dev.), 84 bill. EUR (developed)—87 bill. EUR (rural), 121 bill. 
EUR (urban). Shares of total value may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Total number of observations 
for first subset: 2,039,648–479,032 (less dev.), 589,451 (developed)—310,350 (rural), 223,746 (urban); 
second subset: 1,692,990–372,522 (less dev.), 416,879 (developed)—310,350 (rural), 188,237 (urban); 
third subset: 778,196–310,754 (less dev.), 335,997 (developed)—310,350 (rural), 223,746 (urban). For 
details regarding the data coverage of each variable refer to the previous section
Category Share of regional sum of project values
Total sam-
ple (%)
Less developed 
regions (%)
Developed 
regions (%)
Rural 
regions 
(%)
Urban 
regions 
(%)
CF 4 4 3 5 3
ERDF 55 56 60 62 42
ERDF or CF 20 30 7 18 42
ESF 22 10 30 14 13
Capacity building 2 2 2 1 1
Culture heritage and tourism 3 4 2 5 2
Energy 2 3 3 3 2
Environment 15 15 15 24 10
Human capital 9 5 8 6 6
Innovation & RTD 16 15 20 20 16
IT services and infrastructure 4 2 9 3 4
Labour market 8 4 15 6 5
Other SME and business support 11 11 6 15 9
Other transport 4 3 4 3 6
Rail 4 5 1 0 9
Road 10 17 1 2 23
Social inclusion 6 4 10 4 3
Social infrastructure 5 6 3 7 3
Urban and territorial dimension 3 4 1 1 0
Large company 17 20 13 26 15
Medium sized company 17 20 12 23 14
Small company 39 28 53 37 27
Very large company 27 32 22 14 45
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(see Table  4). For example, Road accounts for 17% of the sum of project values 
in less developed regions and only for 1% in higher-income regions. Moreover, the 
share targeted at Labour Market projects in richer regions exceeds that in poorer 
ones by 11 percentage points.
Industrial structure and firm size
The matched data from ORBIS allows us to go into more detail with respect to 
characteristics of the beneficiaries. Figure 4 shows the distribution of funds across 
NACE Rev. 2 industries. The left-hand side illustrates total sums while the right-
hand side shows the distribution of individual project values. The matching process 
and the coverage in ORBIS enable us to assign an industry to one third of observa-
tions, i.e., almost 700,000 projects.
Overall, Fig. 4 (left part) shows that projects with the highest sum of total values 
are carried out by firms or institutions operating in public administration, defence 
and social security (EUR 80 billion), transportation and manufacturing (EUR 30 
billion each) and education (EUR 20 billion). The right-hand side of Fig. 4 shows 
that the single project volumes also vary across beneficiaries in different industries. 
While the median value of projects carried out by public beneficiaries (NACE Rev. 
2 industry O) lies clearly below EUR 100,000, firms operating in the energy and 
water sector are responsible for the projects with highest median values (over EUR 
200,000). Most of the latter projects have to do with electricity production, air con-
ditioning, water supply as well as waste collection and treatment.
Beneficiary firms or institutions also differ in their size. Table 4 shows the dis-
tribution of regional funds across four categories of firm size defined by ORBIS.29 
In terms of overall project sums, small firms make up the largest share (EUR 120 
billion), followed by very large firms (EUR 80 billion) and medium-sized as well as 
large firms (EUR 50 billion each). Note that there are fifteen times more small bene-
ficiaries of structural funds than very large ones. They are especially strongly repre-
sented in projects co-financed by the ESF. In total, 85% of recipients in the database 
are small or medium-sized (SME) companies, which reflects the priorities set out in 
the Community’s strategic guidelines on cohesion. Moreover, this may indicate that 
the projects, which smaller and medium-sized firms submitted in order to apply for 
co-funding and which were selected, are smaller in terms of single project values 
than the projects carried out by large firms.
Interestingly, Table 4 shows that while managing authorities in regions with an income 
above 75% of the EU average (developed ones) select mostly projects carried out by small 
firms, in less developed regions the volumes of projects carried out by very large compa-
nies is higher. Also the share of project values administered by SMEs in less developed 
regions falls behind the share in higher-income regions by 17 percentage points. There 
is a similar heterogeneity when comparing projects in rural and urban regions, and it is 
the share of the value of projects carried out by very large firms in urban regions which 
29 ORBIS considers companies to be small if they could not be classified, which could possibly inflate 
the number of small companies due to missing data. However, labelling the observations based on the 
number of employees, we find a similar distribution of labels.
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exceeds the one in rural areas by more than 30 percentage points. This pattern may be 
driven by the fact that cities implement relatively many large projects.
5  Focus on the single beneficiary
Given the evidence on substantial variation in the total value of single projects, we 
investigate the potential determinants of this variable for the projects in our data-
base. In particular we hypothesise that the project size is closely related to the fol-
lowing characteristics: (1) the funding instrument (ERDF, ESF or CF), as certain 
types of funds typically co-finance different kinds of projects, (2) the objective of 
the corresponding OP (Convergence or Regional Competitiveness and Employment), 
which mirrors the development status of the region, (3) the managing authorities’ 
focus on thematic priorities (themes), e.g., a project which consists of building road 
infrastructure will have a higher value than a specific employee’s training, and (4) 
beneficiaries’ characteristics like size or industry. Regarding firm size, our hypoth-
esis is that, on average, larger firms are capable of carrying out larger projects than 
smaller firms.
To this end, we estimate the following equation:
where ln(TVi) represents the logarithm of the total project value of project i, Ri the 
region in which project i is located (a sort of regional fixed effect), Fi the type of 
(4)ln(TVi) = 훼 + 휓Ri + 훾Fi + 훿Oi + 휌Ti + 휙Ii + 휔Si + 휀
Fig. 4  Sum of total project values and single project values by NACE Rev. 2 industry. Notes: Left: sum 
of total project values by NACE Rev. 2 industry. Right: distribution of values per project; dark horizon-
tal line marks the median. A: agriculture, forestry, fishing; B: mining, quarrying; C: manufacturing; D: 
energy; E: water supply, sewerage, waste management; F: construction; G: wholesale; H: transportation; 
I: accommodation and food services; J: information and communication; K: financial services; L: real 
estate services; M: professional, scientific and technical activities; N: administration and support activi-
ties; O: public administration, defence, social security; P: education; Q: human health and social work; 
R: arts, entertainment, recreation; S: other services, T: household services, U: activities of extraterritorial 
organisations. The figure represents 33% of observations and 51% of the sum of total values
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fund which supports project i, Oi the objective of the funding for project i, Ti the 
theme under which project i is supported, Ii the industry of the beneficiary and Si 
the size of the beneficiary of project i. The variables Ri , Fi , Oi , Ti , Ii and Si are fac-
tor variables and the category with the median coefficient is always the one that 
is excluded respectively (in the following Tables). Thus, the resulting coefficients 
should be interpreted relative to the project with the coefficient being in the middle 
of the (conditional) distribution of this variable, which is always shown in the results 
tables with a coefficient of zero. Significance levels are not shown, as they depend 
entirely on the chosen reference category and have no general meaning in such a 
context.30 We do not include projects with total values which are zero or negative 
and end up with 482,040 observations for which Eq. (4) is estimated.31
In this way, we are able to shed light on conditional differences between the vol-
ume of projects supported by different funds with different objectives and themes 
as well as with beneficiaries in different industries and of different size. Moreover, 
we are able to analyse whether unexplained residual variation in project volumes (in 
countries and regions) exists. We think that this could entail interesting policy impli-
cations as Locatelli et al. (2017) show for public procurement processes that funding 
larger projects prepares the ground for more corruption than it would be the case 
when more and smaller projects are tendered. Other analyses show that firm subsi-
dies are not equally effective when granted to firms of different size (Criscuolo et al. 
2012) and to firms located in different regions (Bachtrögler et al. 2018).
In order to take the heterogeneity of funding principles into account, we analyse 
total values of single projects not only for the complete sample but additionally run 
Eq. (4) separately for, first, projects co-funded by (1) the ERDF and the ESF (struc-
tural funds) and (2) the CF. Second, we split the sample into projects carried out by 
(1) public and (2) private beneficiaries.32 Finally, in a robustness check in which we 
model firm size by the number of employees, volume of sales and add firm age as 
a further control variable, we run regressions using sub-samples of projects carried 
out in (1) less developed and (2) developed regions, as well as, (3) urban and (4) 
rural regions.
5.1  Type of fund, objective and themes
Controlling for the other variables included in Eq. (4), the projects with the small-
est total value can be identified as co-funded by the ESF (left panel of Table  5). 
30 While a coefficient might be highly significant with respect to reference category A, it could be not 
significant with respect to category B. Thus, one might create any significance level by choosing a 
respective reference category. Only the coefficient keeps its meaning. Wherever there is a specific mean-
ing to the significance level, such as for revenues or the number of employees of a beneficiary, we also 
report the significance levels.
31 Only observations matched with ORBIS data can be considered for the econometric exercises in this 
section.
32 Here, we consider beneficiaries in the NACE Rev. 2 sector “O—Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security” (according to ORBIS data) as public firms, whereas all other sectors are 
categorised as private.
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They are more than three-quarters smaller than those co-funded by the ERDF and 
(on average) by the CF (if the projects that cannot be assigned clearly to the ERDF 
or the CF are counted as CF co-funded ones). This corresponds to the goals of the 
various funds, as the ESF is mostly funding smaller projects related to the inclusion, 
training and adaptability of workers in the labour market and employment, while 
the ERDF and CF funds are aimed at improving the economic structure and fun-
damentals of regions (European Commission 2017). Splitting the sample by broad 
industries reveals that CF projects carried out by public entities are on average twice 
as large in terms of their project value than ESF projects. Likewise, relative to ESF 
project values, CF projects are (on average) largest in the case of beneficiaries in the 
private sector.
Furthermore, controlling for everything else, Table 5 shows that projects corre-
sponding to OPs with the Convergence objective are larger than projects under the 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective (right panel of Table 5).
Turning to another aspect, large differences in conditional project values arise 
also with respect to the projects’ themes. 42% of the largest projects in the data-
base (with a volume above EUR 50 million) are associated with the three transport-
related themes (Rail, Road, Other Transport). As also found in the unconditional 
analysis in Sect. 4, it might not be surprising that the projects with themes related 
to Labour Market, Human Capital and SME are among the projects with the lowest 
conditional project values, but the Energy theme would probably be expected to be 
among the one with the highest project values (see Table 6). Regarding the latter 
theme, there is large variation across subsets and it turns out that especially Energy 
projects co-financed by the CF and carried out by private-sector (but not public-
sector) beneficiaries are rather small.
In general, the largest projects co-financed across all subsets are targeted at Road 
and Other Transportation infrastructure (and fostering the Urban and Territorial 
Dimension in the case of the CF). Interestingly, relatively bigger investment projects 
in Rail systems appear to be co-financed by structural funds (and not the CF) and 
implemented by private entities (not public ones). The same is true for projects with 
a relatively high conditional value in the fields of Social Infrastructure, Environment 
and Innovation & RTD.33
Moreover, conditional differences in project values across themes do not neces-
sarily correspond to the differences across industries. An interesting observation is 
that the lowest project values can be observed for the Energy theme, but the highest 
conditional project values for the energy industry (Sect. 5.2). The maximum project 
value within the Energy theme as well as the energy industry is found for the same 
project which amounts to EUR 906 million. However, the Energy theme includes 
7715 projects with a project value of EUR 1250 each and 64% of the projects have a 
value below EUR 5000. Those projects below EUR 5000 are not conducted by firms 
in the energy industry but are observed mainly in “Real Estate activities” (59%), 
“Manufacturing” (11%) and “Wholesale/retail; repair vehicles” (8%).
33 Note that the education sector (NACE Rev. 2) includes both private and public entities but is consid-
ered as belonging to the private sector in this analysis.
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5.2  Industry and beneficiaries’ characteristics
The highest conditional project values are attributed to beneficiaries in the Energy 
and Water industries (Table  7). The largest three project values of firms in the 
Energy industry are EUR 906 million, EUR 103 million and EUR 100 million and 
only 37% of the projects have a total value below EUR 100,000. Within the Whole-
sale industry, on the other hand, only 12% of the projects have total values larger 
than EUR 100,000.
As expected, firm size also plays a role for the level of the total project value 
(Table 8). Overall, we see that the larger the beneficiary, the larger is the total value. 
However, the difference in project volumes is surprisingly low, as the volume of a 
project of a very large company is not even twice the one of a medium-sized com-
pany but the average revenue of the very large companies in our sample (EUR 653 
million) is approximately 130 times the average revenue of the medium-sized com-
panies (EUR 5 million). The pattern is similar when considering the samples split 
according to the co-financing type of fund and the sector the beneficiary operates in.
5.3  Residual variation in single project values
Comparing the total value of single projects across NUTS-2 regions, while con-
trolling for the type of fund, objective, theme, industry and size of the beneficiary, 
reveals differences of more than plus and minus 400%. The twenty top and bottom 
regions are presented in Table 9. The lowest conditional amounts per project can be 
found in Austria, Spain, Estonia, Germany and Belgium. The highest conditional 
values per project can be observed in the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Malta and 
Table 5  Regression coefficients with respect to type of fund and objective
Coefficients of regressions based on Eq. (4). White-robust standard errors. Dependent variable: logarithm 
of the total project value. Other control variables (region, industry, theme, firm size) are also included 
but reported in previous and subsequent tables. Coefficients of respective dummy variable relative to the 
median category. ERDF European Regional Development Fun, ESF European Social Fund, CF Cohesion 
Fund. Columns “General”: 482,040 degrees of freedom, adj. R2 of 0.46. Columns “Public”: 69,351; Adj. 
R
2 0.62. Columns “Private”: 412,689; Adj. R2 0.48
Type of 
fund
Coef. (Eq. 4) Objective 
(Eq. 4)
Coef.
General 
(%)
Public (%) Private (%) General 
(%)
Public (%) Private (%)
ERDF or 
CF
+ 129 + 158 + 98 Conver-
gence
+18 + 17 + 28
ERDF + 78 + 25 + 61 Regional 
Comp. 
and 
Employ-
ment
0 0 0
CF + 35 + 41 + 53
ESF 0 0 0
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Luxembourg.34 Beneficiaries which are similar in size, are in the same industry, 
receive money from the same fund and within the same theme, but are located in 
Lower Austria (NUTS-2 region AT11) on average have about 8.5 times lower pro-
ject values than beneficiaries located in the East of England (NUTS-1 region UKH). 
Apparently, in Lower Austria, 90% of projects are smaller than EUR 10,000 and 
4688 projects are smaller than EUR 1000, whereas in the East of England the small-
est project is already EUR 133,168 in size.
Table 10 shows regional effects based on estimating Eq. (4) for subsets related to 
project and beneficiary characteristics. First, the upper panel shows the ten regions 
in which, conditional on the other control variables, the biggest and smallest pro-
jects co-funded by structural funds on the one hand, and the Cohesion Fund on the 
Table 6  Regression coefficients with respect to theme
Coefficients of regressions based on Eq.  (4). White-robust standard errors. Dependent variable: loga-
rithm of the total project value. Other control variables (firm size, industry, region, fund type and objec-
tive) are also included but reported in other tables. Coefficients of respective dummy variable relative 
to the median category. “Type of fund” is excluded as control in columns 3 and 4. “NACE industry” is 
excluded as control in columns 5 and 6
Theme General (Eq. 4) Structural 
funds 
(Eq. 4)
Cohe-
sion fund 
(Eq. 4)
Public (Eq. 4) Private (Eq. 4)
Road + 270% + 238% + 225% + 248% + 151%
Other transport + 216% + 191% + 85% + 143% + 218%
Rail + 186% + 124% + 11% − 94% + 208%
Culture heritage and tour-
ism
+ 69% + 73% − 32% + 59% + 70%
Urban and territorial dimen-
sion
+ 45% + 46% + 99% − 12% + 57%
Social infrastructure + 40% + 37% − 62% − 8% + 94%
Environment + 29% + 37% − 128% − 18% + 49%
Innovation & RTD + 29% + 40% − 100% − 4% + 52%
IT services and infrastruc-
ture
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Labour market − 14% − 38% − 81% − 43% + 11%
Capacity building − 15% − 22% − 143% − 44% + 3%
Social inclusion − 22% − 48% − 130% − 87% + 12%
Other SME and business 
support
− 66% − 67% − 129% − 353% − 27%
Human capital − 68% − 94% − 3% − 65% − 27%
Energy − 124% − 15% − 296% 61% − 92%
Adj.  R2 0.49 0.46 0.70 0.62 0.48
No. of observations 482,040 452,726 29,314 69,351 412,689
34 Interestingly, the top six UK regions had a majority vote for “Leave” in the Brexit referendum 2016.
 Empirica
1 3
Table 7  Regression coefficients with respect to NACE-industry
Coefficients of regressions based on Eq. (4). White-robust standard errors. Dependent variable: logarithm 
of the total project value. Other control variables (firm size, region, fund type and objective, theme) are 
also included but reported in previous and subsequent tables. Coefficients of respective dummy variable 
relative to the median category. “Type of fund” is excluded as control in columns 3 and 4
Industry NACE code General (Eq. 4) Structural 
funds (Eq. 4)
Cohe-
sion fund 
(Eq. 4)
D—Energy (without water) + 145% + 112% + 177%
E—Water supply; sewerage, waste mgmt. and rem. act. + 89% + 44% + 156%
Q—Human health and social work activities + 52% + 50% + 19%
P—Education + 31% + 25% + 92%
T—Activities of households as employers + 29% + 44% − 157%
U—Activities of extraterr. organisations and bodies + 23% + 14% –
B—Mining and quarrying + 21% + 23% + 68%
M—Professional, scientific and techn. activities + 15% + 14% + 20%
J—Information and communication + 13% + 17% + 20%
S—Other service activities + 10% + 6% − 30%
H—Transportation and storage + 5% − 9% + 69%
O—Public adm. and defense; compulsory social security + 3% + 5% + 24%
R—Arts, entertainment and recreation 0% 0% 0%
C—Manufacturing − 2% + 3% + 17%
I—Accommodation and food service activities − 12% − 15% + 17%
L—Real estate activities − 14% + 47% − 101%
N—Administrative and support service activities − 15% − 14% − 76%
K—Financial and insurance activities − 20% − 18% − 57%
F—Construction − 21% − 23% − 1%
G—Wholesale/retail; repair vehicles − 41% − 43% − 8%
A—Agriculture, forestry and fishing − 43% − 37% − 55%
Adj.  R2 0.49 0.46 0.70
No. of observations 482,040 452,726 29,314
Table 8  Regression coefficients with respect to the beneficiaries’ size
Coefficients of regressions based on Eq.  (4). Dependent variable: logarithm of the total project value. 
Other control variables (firm size, industry, region, fund type and objective) are also included but 
reported in other tables. Coefficients of respective dummy variable relative to the median category
Theme General (Eq. 4) Structural 
funds 
(Eq. 4)
Cohe-
sion fund 
(Eq. 4)
Public (Eq. 4) Private (Eq. 4)
Very large company + 91% + 84% + 131% + 91% + 109%
Large company + 32% + 31% + 44% + 32% + 37%
Medium-sized company 0 % 0% 0% 0% 0%
Small company − 31% − 31% − 29% − 30% − 27%
Adj.  R2 0.49 0.46 0.70 0.62 0.48
No. of observations 482,040 452,726 29,314 69,351 412,689
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other hand, were carried out. While the results for the first case broadly reflect the 
regional effects identified for the complete sample, the Cohesion Fund sample only 
includes a limited set of countries. From the regions located in those lagging-behind 
countries, projects in Estonia, the Czech Republic as well as some parts of Spain are 
smallest.
The lower panel of Table 10 indicates that there may be differences in selecting 
private and public beneficiaries across countries. While Austrian regions and Esto-
nia form part of the Bottom 10-group only in the case of private firms, the smallest 
conditional project values for beneficiaries in the public sector are present in Span-
ish, one Italian and two German regions. Interestingly, next to British and Dutch 
regions, projects by public institutions are relatively big in size in Helsinki-Uusima 
(FI1B), Finland, and those of firms in the private sector in Malta.
The estimation of Eq.  (4) controls for regional fixed effects, thus, any regional 
influence on the remaining differences between total project values of single pro-
jects should have been removed. Figure 5 shows the average residuals of a regres-
sion similar to Eq. (4), but excluding the regional control variables ( Ri ). Hence, the 
figure shows the (average) unexplained part of the project value when controlling for 
fund type, objective, theme, industry and firm size split by country. It confirms that 
the projects, which are similar in many dimensions but the region, with the lowest 
total values can be found in Austria, Estonia and Spain and the ones with the highest 
values in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK.
Due to the findings in Sect. 4 and as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK 
and Denmark are relatively densely populated, one could suggest that popula-
tion density determines that finding. However, the relationship is not that clear. 
The residual variation for Finland, which is the least densely populated country 
in Europe, is also relatively high, while Germany, which is relatively densely 
populated, shows a downward bias with regard to conditional average project 
Table 9  Regression coefficients with respect to NUTS-2 region
Coefficients of regressions based on Eq. (4) (482,040 degrees of freedom, adj. R2 of 0.49). White-robust 
standard errors. Dependent variable: logarithm of the total project value. Other control variables (firm 
size, industry, fund type and objective, theme) are also included but reported in subsequent tables. Coef-
ficients are relative to the median NUTS2-region which is FR25
Top 20 (Eq. 4) Bottom 20 (Eq. 4)
UKH + 405% MT00 + 234% ES52 − 254% ES42 − 279%
UKE + 372% UKM + 224% DE1 − 255% ES12 − 297%
UKL + 338% NL12 + 223% BE35 − 256% ES53 − 309%
UKC + 314% NL31 + 222% DE6 − 258% ES22 − 310%
NL13 + 296% NL33 + 219% BE34 − 260% ES41 − 310%
NL11 + 266% NL32 + 214% ES24 − 262% EE00 − 318%
UKG + 259% UKD + 198% DEA − 263% ES23 − 349%
UKK + 253% NL21 + 192% AT13 − 265% ES13 − 362%
NL22 + 236% NL23 + 190% ES21 − 268% AT11 − 376%
FI1B + 234% LU00 + 188% ES62 − 269% AT12 − 461%
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volumes. Referring to Locatelli et al. (2017), the countries with the largest resid-
uals are characterised by relatively low levels of corruption and good institu-
tions at the regional level (Charron et al. 2015). Therefore, we suspect that the 
variation may be determined by historically grown funding strategies and fur-
ther national institutional settings. Verifying this assumption remains for future 
research.
Table 10  NUTS-2 regression coefficients for subsamples
Dependent variable: logarithm of the total project value. Coefficients are relative to the median NUTS2-
region which is FR25. White-robust standard errors. Upper panel, columns 1–4: Subsample with only 
projects co-funded by structural funds (ERDF and ESF). Number of observations: 452,726, Adjusted  R2: 
0.46. Upper panel, columns 5–8: Subsample with only CF projects. Number of observations: 29,314, 
Adjusted  R2: 0.70. Lower panel, columns 1–4: Beneficiaries in the public sector (NACE Rev. 2 sector 
O). Number of observations: 69,351, Adjusted  R2: 0.63. Lower panel, columns 5–8: Beneficiaries in the 
private sector and not NACE Rev. 2 sector O, respectively. Number of observations: 412,689, Adjusted 
 R2: 0.48
Structural funds Cohesion fund
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10
UKH + 396% DEA − 277% ES70 + 469% CZ03 − 193%
UKE + 390% DE1 − 278% HR03 + 254% CZ05 − 193%
UKL + 347% ES53 − 291% ES21 + 245% CZ04 − 198%
UKC + 333% ES22 − 295% HR04 + 192% CZ06 − 206%
NL13 + 316% ES12 − 296% RO32 + 177% CZ08 − 207%
NL11 + 287% ES41 − 306% PT20 + 171% CZ07 − 207%
UKG + 281% ES23 − 332% RO31 + 155% CZ01 − 213%
UKK + 276% ES13 − 352% RO11 + 147% ES − 214%
NL33 + 258% AT11 − 381% RO21 + 137% ES64 − 230%
NL31 + 258% AT12 − 451% PT30 + 123% EE00 − 404%
Public beneficiaries Private beneficiaries
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10
UKE + 544% ES43 − 199% UKH + 371% ES13 − 264%
UKC + 468% ES64 − 228% UKL + 361% ES51 − 267%
UKL + 394% ES22 − 233% UKE + 345% AT22 − 270%
FI1B + 374% ES12 − 235% MT00 + 316% ES41 − 272%
UKM + 332% ES23 − 236% UKC + 297% ES53 − 278%
UKH + 332% DE6 − 264% UKK + 278% AT13 − 281%
UKG + 329% ES53 − 267% NL11 + 246% ES23 − 306%
NL12 + 327% DEB − 281% UKG + 246% EE00 − 308%
NL13 + 322% ITC4 − 304% NL13 + 235% AT11 − 375%
NL23 + 303% ES13 − 351% UKM + 222% AT12 − 492%
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6  Conclusion
The novel database introduced in this study contains detailed information on over 
two million projects co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund in 25 EU member states in the pro-
gramming period 2007–2013. Additional to project information such as the total 
value of each project and a project category (theme), the beneficiaries are matched 
with the ORBIS business database.
This study shows that there are different patterns in the intraregional funds dis-
tribution across and within countries, both in terms of project and beneficiary char-
acteristics. Moreover, the analysis points to the fact that managing authorities select 
different kinds of projects, with significantly different single project volumes, in 
urban and rural regions. The same turns out to be true for less developed and other 
NUTS-2 regions, which seems to be linked to the priorities and regulations of cer-
tain types of funds, e.g., the CF, and main objectives.
In addition, we find that most regional funds are dedicated to transportation infra-
structure in less developed regions, whereas in higher-income regions a larger focus 
is put on fostering Labour market and Social inclusion. In all regions, Innovation 
and RTD as well as Environment projects form a large share of the sum of pro-
ject values. Regarding beneficiaries’ characteristics, the largest share—on average 
around 40%—of the (unconditional) sum is allocated to projects carried out by small 
firms, whereas this does not hold true for less developed and urban regions.
In the econometric analysis we test for the importance of certain project and benefi-
ciaries’ characteristics in determining a single project’s size. The largest single projects 
in terms of their total value are co-funded by the ERDF and the CF (as compared to the 
ESF), and under the Convergence objective (as compared to Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment). In line with the priorities of the different funding instruments, the largest 
Fig. 5  Comparison of residuals of regression of Eq. (4) by country
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projects are attributed to transportation infrastructure projects (Road, Rail and Other Trans-
port). Regarding the beneficiary, larger firms (with higher revenues and more employees) 
carry out projects with higher total value, however, the average single project value of 
(very) large firms is only about twice as high as that of small entities. Having controlled 
for all characteristics, some variation in single project values remains unexplained, and this 
residual variation appears to differ across countries. From that we draw the conclusion that 
national institutional settings or traditional funding procedures may play a role.
We contribute to the academic and political debate by making a dimension of EU 
cohesion policy implementation visible that has not gained much attention until now. The 
possibility to compare individual projects’ and beneficiaries’ characteristics across het-
erogeneous regions and countries opens a new strand of research questions, e.g., whether 
projects in a region are carried out by firms located in the same region and by what this 
is determined. Moreover, the data could feed in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
or other forecasting models that simulate potential policy outcomes under different sce-
narios. Finally, the analysis of this dataset may entail interesting conclusions on more or 
less effective ways of distributing regional funds within European regions. In this respect, 
we also think that future research could explore how the considerable residual variation in 
the size of projects found in this paper is related to institutional settings in the respective 
countries as well as to the efficiency and effectiveness of EU cohesion policy.
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Appendix
List of operational programmes and coverage in the novel database
In the following table, we first report the fund co-financing the particular OP and 
the objective under which it operates as well as the geographical unit concerned 
(NUTS-2 or NUTS-1 or NUTS-0).35 Second, Table 11 states the declaration date of 
35 For the Netherlands, there are only national, i.e., no region-specific operational programmes and 
the official beneficiary lists do not contain information on their location. Partly, a NUTS-1 classifica-
tion would be possible. However, we learn about the NUTS-2 region in which beneficiaries operate from 
ORBIS in two thirds of Dutch projects. To observations with an ORBIS match and a non-missing value 
for the postal code in ORBIS, we can assign a NUTS-3 region.
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each OP, i.e., the reporting date of the list of beneficiaries or, if not provided by the 
managing authority, the date when we downloaded the list. Finally, Table 11 indi-
cates the degree of detail of reported project sums: From only committed co-financ-
ing values (C) to EU and national public co-funding and private ineligible expendi-
ture data (C_EU + C_NAT + I), and whether we know the value actually paid-out.
Robustness check
For a smaller sample of projects additional information from ORBIS is available. 
Table 12 presents the regression results including additional data, i.e., estimating the 
following:
where Ui is the sales volume of the beneficiary of project i, Ei the number of employ-
ees of the beneficiary (sales and number of employees corresponds to the last availa-
ble observation in ORBIS) and Yi the founding year of the beneficiary (in five brack-
ets—before 1950, between 1950 and 1980, between 1980 and 2000, between 2000 
and 2010 and after 2010). Furthermore, the regression contains all control variables 
included in Eq. (4), apart from the size of the beneficiary Si as this ORBIS variable 
depends on the number of employees of the beneficiary Ei and its revenue Ui . In 
order to exploit the variance of relationships between project and beneficiary char-
acteristics across regions, the regressions are not only done for the whole sample for 
which all of these variables are available. Further, we split the sample into (1) rural 
versus (2) urban regions as well as (3) less developed versus (4) developed (not clas-
sified as less developed by the 75% threshold applied to regional GDP relative to the 
EU average) regions. In those estimations, contrarily to previous ones, country-fixed 
effects are included instead of region-fixed effects.
Estimation results confirm that the size of the beneficiary matters for the value 
of a single project. Controlling for all other variables, higher revenues and more 
employees are associated with significantly higher single project values. When the 
number of employees of a beneficiary firm increases by 1%, the project it carries out 
is by 12% larger in terms of the project value. Taking into account whether a pro-
ject and beneficiary, respectively, is located in an urban or rural region, this number 
amounts to 14% in rural and 17% in urban regions. Also in less developed regions 
this difference holds true. However, when considering only developed regions a one-
percent-rise in employment is associated with only a slightly higher total project 
value (by 2%) .
Furthermore, the age of the firm or institution receiving funds matters. Especially 
in less developed (as compared to other) and rural (as compared to urban) regions, 
younger beneficiaries which were founded after 2000 and after 2010 have projects 
with significantly higher total values than companies which were founded before 
that. Beneficiaries incorporated before 1980 carry out projects with the smallest 
total values.
Single projects’ values in various industries (NACE Rev. 2 sectors) also differ 
between urban and rural as well as less developed and other regions. In some cases 
(5)ln(TVi) = 훼 + 휓Ri + 훾Fi + 훿Oi + 휌Ti + 휙Ii + 휅Ui + 휆Ei + 휇Yi + 휀
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Table 11  List of operational programmes (OP)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
BG 2007BG051PO001 ESF 1 ORBIS C No 11.06.2015
BG 2007BG051PO002 ESF 1 – – – –
BG 2007BG161PO001 ERDF 1 – – – –
BG 2007BG161PO002 ERDF 1 – – – –
BG 2007BG161PO003 ERDF 1 – – – –
BG 2007BG161PO004 ERDF & CF 1 – – – –
BG 2007BG161PO005 ERDF & CF 1 0 C Yes 2.07.2013
BE 2007BE051PO001 ESF 1 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE052PO001 ESF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE052PO002 ESF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE052PO003 ESF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE052PO004 ESF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE052PO005 ESF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE162PO001 ERDF 2 2 – Yes 10.2014
BE 2007BE162PO002 ERDF 2 ORBIS C Yes 09.2014
BE 2007BE162PO003 ERDF 2 ORBIS C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 10.2014
CZ 2007CZ052PO001 ESF 2 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ05UPO002 ESF 1 & 2 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO002 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO004 ERDF 1 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO006 ERDF & CF 1 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO007 ERDF & CF 1 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO008 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO009 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO010 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO012 ERDF 1 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ161PO013 ERDF 1 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ16UPO001 ERDF 1 & 2 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
CZ 2007CZ16UPO002 ERDF 1 & 2 0 C_EU Yes 04.09.2015
DK 2007DK052PO001 ESF 2 2 – Yes 08.09.2015
DK 2007DK162PO001 ERDF 2 2 – Yes 08.09.2015
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
DE 2007DE051PO001 ESF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE051PO002 ESF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2013
DE 2007DE051PO003 ESF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.03.2015
DE 2007DE051PO004 ESF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 06.2015
DE 2007DE051PO005 ESF 1 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE051PO006 ESF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE052PO001 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 30.04.2014
DE 2007DE052PO002 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 08.12.2014
DE 2007DE052PO003 ESF 2 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE052PO004 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 06.11.2013
DE 2007DE052PO005 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2013
DE 2007DE052PO006 ESF 2 1 C – 28.02.2014
DE 2007DE052PO007 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.03.2015
DE 2007DE052PO008 ESF 2 1 C – 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE052PO009 ESF 2 1 C Partly yes 30.06.2014
DE 2007DE052PO010 ESF 2 1 C – 05.10.2015
DE 2007DE052PO011 ESF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 06.2015
DE 2007DE05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 0 C (or paid-
out)
Yes 30.04.2015
DE 2007DE161PO001 ERDF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE161PO002 ERDF 1 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE161PO003 ERDF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2013
DE 2007DE161PO004 ERDF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 06.2015
DE 2007DE161PO005 ERDF 1 0 C – 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE161PO006 ERDF 1 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.03.2015
DE 2007DE161PO007 ERDF 1 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO001 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO002 ERDF 2 1 C Yes 31.12.2013
DE 2007DE162PO003 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO004 ERDF 2 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
DE 2007DE162PO005 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 16.04.2015
DE 2007DE162PO006 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 16.09.2015
DE 2007DE162PO007 ERDF 2 1 C Yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO008 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO009 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.12.2014
DE 2007DE162PO010 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 31.03.2015
DE 2007DE162PO011 ERDF 2 1 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 01.07.2015
EE 2007EE051PO001 ESF 1 2 C Yes 31.08.2015
EE 2007EE161PO001 ERDF & CF 1 2 C Yes 31.08.2015
EE 2007EE161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C Yes 31.08.2015
ES 2007ES051PO002 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO003 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO004 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO005 ESF 1 2 C Yes 25.07.2013
ES 2007ES051PO006 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO007 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO008 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES051PO009 ESF 1 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO001 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO002 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO003 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO004 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO005 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO006 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO007 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO008 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO009 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO010 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES052PO011 ESF 2 2 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 0 C Yes 25.07.2013
ES 2007ES05UPO002 ESF 1 & 2 0 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES05UPO003 ESF 1 & 2 0 C Yes 20.05.2013
ES 2007ES161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO002 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO004 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO006 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
ES 2007ES161PO007 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO008 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES161PO009 ERDF & CF 1 0 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 01.02.2016
ES 2007ES162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO003 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO004 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO005 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO006 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO007 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO008 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO009 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO010 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES162PO011 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES16UPO001 ERDF 2 0 C Yes 13.10.2015
ES 2007ES16UPO002 ERDF 1 & 2 0 C Yes 31.10.2015
ES 2007ES16UPO003 ERDF 1 & 2 0 C Yes 31.10.2015
FR 2007FR051PO001 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR051PO002 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR051PO003 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR051PO004 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR052PO001 ESF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
–
FR 2007FR161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR161PO002 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR161PO004 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO005 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO006 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO007 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO008 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO009 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
FR 2007FR162PO010 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO011 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO012 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO013 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO014 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO015 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO016 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO017 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO018 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO019 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO020 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO021 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
FR 2007FR162PO022 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 20.07.2016
HR 2007HR051PO001 ESF 1 ORBIS C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 01.02.2015
HR 2007HR161PO001 CF 1 ORBIS C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 01.07.2015
HR 2007HR161PO002 ERDF 1 ORBIS C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 01.06.2015
HR 2007HR161PO003 ERDF 1 ORBIS C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 10.06.2015
IE 2007IE052PO001 ESF 2 0 C or paid-out – 19.09.2016
IE 2007IE162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes 10.2015
IE 2007IE162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C Yes (2) 09.2016
IT 2007IT051PO001 ESF 1 2 – – 16.02.2015
IT 2007IT051PO002 ESF 1 2 C Yes 22.10.2015
IT 2007IT051PO003 ESF 1 2 C Yes 27.09.2012
IT 2007IT051PO004 ESF 1 2 C Yes 30.10.2014
(ITC2 & ITF5)
IT 2007IT051PO005 ESF 1 2 C – 30.12.2013
IT 2007IT051PO006 ESF 1 2 C Yes 19.01.2015
IT 2007IT051PO007 ESF 1 – – – –
IT 2007IT052PO001 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
IT 2007IT052PO002 ESF 2 2 C – 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO003 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2013
IT 2007IT052PO004 ESF 2 2 C – 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO005 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO006 ESF 2 2 C – 31.09.2015
IT 2007IT052PO007 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2013
IT 2007IT052PO008 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO009 ESF 2 2 C Yes 19.05.2015
IT 2007IT052PO010 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO011 ESF 2 2 C Yes 05.10.2015
IT 2007IT052PO012 ESF 2 2 C – 14.04.2015
IT 2007IT052PO013 ESF 2 2 C – 16.01.2015
IT 2007IT052PO014 ESF 2 – – – –
IT 2007IT052PO015 ESF 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 31.08.2015
IT 2007IT052PO016 ESF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT052PO017 ESF 2 2 C Yes 19.01.2015
IT 2007IT161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 31.10.2015
IT 2007IT161PO002 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes 31.08.2013
IT 2007IT161PO004 ERDF 1 – – – –
IT 2007IT161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C – 30.12.2015
IT 2007IT161PO006 ERDF 1 – – – –
IT 2007IT161PO007 ERDF 1 2 C Partly yes 14.10.2013
IT 2007IT161PO008 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes 12.01.2016
IT 2007IT161PO009 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes 11.11.2015
IT 2007IT161PO010 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 31.05.2015
IT 2007IT161PO011 ERDF 1 2 C Yes 28.02.2015
IT 2007IT161PO012 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C Yes (2) 13.01.2016
IT 2007IT162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C Partly yes 31.10.2014
IT 2007IT162PO003 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NA
Yes (2) 30.09.2015
IT 2007IT162PO004 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 22.06.2015
IT 2007IT162PO005 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes 31.08.2015
IT 2007IT162PO006 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 15.06.2015
IT 2007IT162PO007 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 25.03.2014
IT 2007IT162PO008 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 31.10.2013
 Empirica
1 3
Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
IT 2007IT162PO009 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 31.09.2015
IT 2007IT162PO010 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 24.07.2015
IT 2007IT162PO011 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 15.01.2016
IT 2007IT162PO012 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 31.12.2014
IT 2007IT162PO013 ERDF 2 2 C Partly yes 23.10.2015
IT 2007IT162PO014 ERDF 2 2 C – 30.06.2013
IT 2007IT162PO015 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 30.06.2015
IT 2007IT162PO016 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 20.11.2015
LV 2007LV051PO001 ESF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 09.08.2015
LV 2007LV161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 09.08.2015
LV 2007LV161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 09.08.2015
LT 2007LT051PO001 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 10.09.2015
LT 2007LT051PO002 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 10.09.2015
LT 2007LT161PO001 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 10.09.2015
LT 2007LT161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 10.09.2015
LU 2007LU052PO001 ESF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 12.2013
LU 2007LU162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 12.2014
MT 2007MT051PO001 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 09.11.2015
MT 2007MT161PO001 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 30.09.2015
NL 2007NL052PO001 ESF 2 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 01.08.2016
NLa 2007NL162PO001 ERDF 2 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 21.11.2016
NL 2007NL162PO002 ERDF 2 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 21.11.2016
NL 2007NL162PO003 ERDF 2 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 02.2015
NL 2007NL162PO004 ERDF 2 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 21.11.2016
AT 2007AT051PO001 ESF 1 2 C Yes 15.08.2015
AT 2007AT052PO001 ESF 2 0 – Yes 20.11.2015
AT 2007AT161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C (or paid-
out)
Partly yes 15.08.2015
AT 2007AT162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
AT 2007AT162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO003 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO004 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO005 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO006 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO007 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
AT 2007AT162PO008 ERDF 2 2 C Yes 13.01.2015
PL 2007PL051PO001 ESF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL051PO001 ESF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO004 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO006 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO007 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO008 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO009 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO010 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO011 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO012 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO013 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO014 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO015 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO016 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO017 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO018 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO019 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PL 2007PL161PO020 ERDF 1 2 C Yes (2) 30.06.2015
PT 2007PT051PO001 ESF 1 – – – –
PT 2007PT052PO001 ESF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 02.11.2015
PT 2007PT05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 0 C – 28.01.2014
PT 2007PT05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 0 C – 28.01.2014
PT 2007PT05UPO002 ESF 1 & 2 0 1: C_EU 
+ C_NAT, 
2: C
– 12.2013
PT 2007PT161PO001 ERDF 1 0 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 22.11.2015
PT 2007PT161PO002 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.07.2015
PT 2007PT161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
PT 2007PT161PO004 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.06.2015
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
PT 2007PT161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.06.2015
PT 2007PT161PO006 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.07.2015
PT 2007PT162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.07.2015
PT 2007PT162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
PT 2007PT16UPO001 ERDF & CF 1 0 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.09.2015
PT 2007PT16UPO002 ERDF 1 & 2 0 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.11.2014
RO 2007RO051PO001 ESF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO051PO002 ESF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO161PO001 ERDF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO161PO002 ERDF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO161PO003 ERDF & CF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO161PO004 ERDF & CF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
RO 2007RO161PO005 ERDF 1 0 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
– 31.07.2015
SI 2007SI051PO001 ESF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 14.10.2015
SI 2007SI161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 14.10.2015
SI 2007SI161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 14.10.2015
SK 2007SK05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK05UPO002 ESF 1 & 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO001 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO002 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO003 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO004 ERDF & CF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO005 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK161PO006 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
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Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
SK 2007SK161PO007 ERDF 1 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
SK 2007SK16UPO001 ERDF 1 & 2 2 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 30.06.2015
FI 2007FI052PO001 ESF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI052PO002 ESF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI162PO001 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI162PO002 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI162PO003 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI162PO004 ERDF 2 2 C_EU + 
C_NAT
Yes (2) 12.10.2015
FI 2007FI162PO005 ERDF 2 – – – –
SE 2007SE052PO001 ESF 2 2 C or paid-out – 18.11.2015
SEb 2007SE162PO001 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO002 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO003 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO004 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO005 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO006 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO007 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
SE 2007SE162PO008 ERDF 2 0 C or paid-out – 06.11.2015
UK 2007UK051PO001 ESF 1 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.04.2014
UK 2007UK051PO002 ESF 1 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 25.08.2016
UK 2007UK052PO001 ESF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 25.08.2016
UK 2007UK052PO002 ESF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.04.2014
UK 2007UK052PO003 ESF 2 1 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 23.11.2016
UK 2007UK05UPO001 ESF 1 & 2 – – – –
UK 2007UK161PO001 ERDF 1 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.04.2014
UK 2007UK161PO002 ERDF 1 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 25.08.2016
UK 2007UK161PO003 ERDF 1 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.01.2015
UK 2007UK162PO001 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 30.04.2014
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the difference might be due to location decisions of the companies and the regional 
sectoral structure. For example, the projects in Financial and insurance activities or 
Other service activities are larger in urban and developed regions. Moreover, pro-
jects with beneficiaries in Water supply, Education and Energy industries are larger 
in rural as compared to urban and (for the Energy industry only slightly smaller) in 
less developed as compared to higher-income (developed) regions.
Table 11  (continued)
OP Code Fund Obj. NUTS Committed Paid-out Declaration 
date
UK 2007UK162PO002 ERDF 2 1 C – 01.05.2014
UK 2007UK162PO003 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Partly yes (3) 08.10.2015
UK 2007UK162PO004 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes (2) 01.01.2014
UK 2007UK162PO005 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.12.2013
UK 2007UK162PO006 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + C_
NAT + I
Yes 01.10.2015
UK 2007UK162PO007 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 29.06.2016
UK 2007UK162PO008 ERDF 2 1 C – 29.06.2016
UK 2007UK162PO009 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 29.06.2016
UK 2007UK162PO010 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 29.06.2016
UK 2007UK162PO011 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 31.01.2015
UK 2007UK162PO012 ERDF 2 1 C_EU + 
C_NAT
– 25.08.2016
UK 2007UK162PO012 ERDF 2 – – – –
This table lists the operational programmes and information found in the official lists of beneficiaries 
provided by regional managing authorities or other regional or national authorities. The underlying list of 
operational programmes including their names can be downloaded at http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic 
y/en/polic y/evalu ation s/data-for-resea rch/ in the section “EU Budget commitments by fund by year and 
by programme” when selection the programming period 2007–2013. aProjects of 2007NL162PO002 and 
2007NL162PO004 are part of the list of beneficiary for OP 2007NL162PO001. bUnequivocal assignment 
of ERDF projects to one of ERDF OPs is not possible. C_EU stands for committed EU co-financing, 
C_NAT for committed national co-financing, and I signifies ineligible cost, i.e., the cost carried by the 
beneficiary. Hence, C_EU + C_NAT + I means that the structure of the total project value is known. C 
means the a committed value, without declared partition across national and EU budget, is reported. A 
“Yes” in column Paid-out means that we have information on paid-out values. “Yes (2)” denotes that we 
know the partition of the paid-out amount into EU and national public co-financing. If the fifth and con-
sequent columns do not contain any information, the dataset does not cover them as we have not found 
beneficiaries lists provided by the respective authorities. When the NUTS dimension given is “ORBIS”, 
it means that we have NUTS-2 information for those beneficiaries of the respective OP we could find 
and and match with the ORBIS database. Objective 1 refers to the Convergence objective, Objective 2 to 
Regional competitiveness and employment
1 3
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Table 12  Regression coefficients with respect to project and all beneficiary characteristics
General
(Eq. 5)
Rural
(Eq. 5)
Urban
(Eq. 5)
Less dev.
(Eq. 5)
Developed
(Eq. 5)
No. of employees (log) 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.02***
Revenues (log) 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.11***
Foundation before 2010 + 54% + 31% − 0% + 94% + 31%
Foundation after 2010 + 49% + 36% + 4% + 106% + 20%
Foundation before 2000 + 49% + 19% + 13% + 86% + 25%
Foundation before 1980 + 7% + 18% − 28% + 85% − 29%
Foundation before 1950 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Convergence + 23% + 44% + 6% − 21% + 4%
CF + 123% + 149% + 127% + 64% + 89%
ERDF + 105% + 115% + 131% + 17% + 128%
ERDF or CF + 100% + 121% + 18% + 80% + 371%
ESF 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
D—Energy (without water) + 116% + 121% + 114% + 92% + 94%
E—Water supply; sewerage, waste + 69% + 88% + 60% + 79% + 54%
U—Extraterr. organ. and bodies + 58% + 63% + 15% + 95%
L—Real estate activities + 49% + 51% + 42% + 16% + 46%
B—Mining and quarrying +26% + 35% + 46% − 0% + 40%
Q—Human health and social work + 20% + 36% + 14% − 11% + 31%
S—Other service activities + 17% + 16% + 41% − 17% + 30%
M—Prof., scientific and techn. act. + 3% + 9% + 1% − 31% + 38%
R—Arts, entertainment and recr. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
P—Education − 6% + 56% − 1% + 41% + 10%
J—Information and communication − 7% + 3% − 5% − 33% + 29%
K—Financial and insurance act. − 10% + 24% + 52% − 90% + 81%
H—Transportation and storage − 13% − 11% − 4% − 41% + 21%
I—Accommodation and food serv. − 13% + 7% − 30% − 19% − 3%
C—Manufacturing − 19% − 7% − 17% − 46% + 15%
N—Admin. and support serv. − 20% − 3% − 19% − 73% + 17%
F—Construction − 39% − 33% − 18% − 53% − 29%
O—Public adm. and defense. − 40% − 38% − 67% − 56% − 38%
G—Wholesale/retail; repair vehicles − 47% − 39% − 34% − 74% − 23%
A—Agriculture, forestry and fishing − 60% − 56% − 52% − 90% − 20%
T—Households as employers − 104% − 110% − 46% − 139% − 99%
Other transport + 245% + 261% + 296% + 206% + 286%
Road + 202% + 269% + 372% + 194% + 55%
Rail + 160% + 83% + 245% + 98% + 173%
Culture heritage and tourism + 143% + 195% + 170% + 110% + 154%
Social inclusion + 55% + 110% + 58% + 14% + 87%
Innovation & RTD + 52% + 99% + 47% + 20% + 77%
Social infrastructure + 52% + 112% + 15% + 24% − 38%
Environment + 44% + 72% + 76% − 20% + 110%
Urban and territorial dimension + 22% + 92% + 112% + 24% + 87%
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When comparing the influence of theme on project values it becomes apparent 
that project size varies considerably between urban and rural (NUTS-3) regions for 
some of the themes. Projects corresponding to the Rail, Other Transport, Environ-
ment, Urban and Territorial Dimension and Energy themes are larger in urban (as 
compared to rural) and developed (compared to less developed) regions. Also Road 
projects are larger in urban regions which may be partly due to higher construction 
costs for infrastructure projects in urban areas. All other themes, especially those tar-
geted at Social Inclusion, Social Infrastructure, Labour Market and Other SME and 
Business Support, are large in terms of conditional project values in rural regions. 
With regard to the development status of the NUTS-2 regions, results suggest that 
relative to IT Services and Infrastructure projects, just Road and Social Infrastruc-
ture are considerably larger in less developed than in higher-income regions.
Finally, the plot of the residual variation, which is not explained by project and 
firm characteristics, by country shows a very similar picture as in the baseline 
regression. The graph is provided in the Online-Appendix of this paper.
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